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THE (HOMOLOGICAL) PERSISTENCE OF GERRYMANDERING
MOON DUCHIN, TOM NEEDHAM AND THOMAS WEIGHILL
Abstract. We apply persistent homology, the dominant tool from the field of topological data analysis, to
study electoral redistricting. Our method combines the geographic information from a political districting
plan with election data to produce a persistence diagram. We are then able to visualize and analyze
large ensembles of computer-generated districting plans of the type commonly used in modern redistricting
research (and court challenges). We set out three applications: zoning a state at each scale of districting,
comparing elections, and seeking signals of gerrymandering. Our case studies focus on redistricting in
Pennsylvania and North Carolina, two states whose legal challenges to enacted plans have raised considerable
public interest in the last few years.
To address the question of robustness of the persistence diagrams to perturbations in vote data and in
district boundaries, we translate the classical stability theorem of Cohen–Steiner et al. into our setting and
find that it can be phrased in a manner that is easy to interpret. We accompany the theoretical bound with
an empirical demonstration to illustrate diagram stability in practice.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we bring the techniques of topological data analysis to bear on electoral redistricting. We
begin by introducing the key notions we will need below.
1.1. Redistricting. In electoral politics, redistricting is the process of drawing new boundary lines for
electoral regions called districts, in which an election will be conducted to select one or more people as
representatives for a governing body. For instance, the United States Congress has a House of Representatives
that has had 435 seats for over a hundred years. These seats are apportioned to the states after every
decennial Census—for instance, the 2010 Census left Pennsylvania with 18 seats and North Carolina with
13, in rough proportion to their population—and then it is left to the various states to partition their territory
into geographically-delimited districts that will elect a single member each. In most cases, it is the state
legislature that controls the process of drawing not only Congressional boundaries, but also the boundaries
for their own legislative districts. In the U.S. system, which is dominated by two major parties, this opens
the door to partisan gerrymandering, where the lines are carefully arranged to maximize the seats secured by
their side, given the anticipated pattern of voting. For instance, the last few years have seen successful legal
challenges in both Pennsylvania and North Carolina, where enacted plans produced by Republican-controlled
legislatures were found to be Republican-favoring “gerrymanders”—in other words, to be so favorable to the
party in charge that they impermissibly subordinate neutral criteria to a partisan agenda. There are many
other kinds of gerrymandering, including agendas with racial components, or to favor or target particular
incumbents, but the present paper focuses on developing mathematical tools to understand the interplay of
district lines and party outcomes.
1.2. Persistent homology. Persistent homology is the most widely recognized tool used in the burgeon-
ing field of topological data analysis (TDA), where concepts from algebraic topology are used to simplify,
summarize and compare complex datasets. Methods from topological data analysis have proven success-
ful in neuroscience [DMFC12, BMM+16], medical diagnostics [NLC11, CMC+19], and machine learning
[AEK+17, CCI+19, GND+19, HKN19], among many other applications—these references are just a selec-
tion of many dozens of examples in each of these areas. However, applications to demographic or electoral
geospatial data seem to be comparatively limited; we only know of a few examples. In [BDP+15], Bajardi
et al. use mobile phone data to study patterns of immigration. In [SHP16], Stoltz et al. use TDA to study
Brexit voting patterns, finding for instance that Switzerland is surrounded by countries with a different
voting tendency. In [BZ18], Banman and Ziegelmeier apply persistent homology to global health and wealth
statistics to uncover subtle developmental disparities between geographically close countries. Finally, in
the example closest to our own approach, Feng and Porter introduce in [FP19] a method for producing a
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topological signature from districting and vote data which is similar to the one we introduce below. The
applications considered in [FP19] are quite different from those considered here: Feng and Porter were pri-
marily interested in studying the vote patterns at the precinct level for fixed regions using their topological
signatures, whereas our goal is to compare districting plans. We will do that by studying topological features
across a collections or “ensembles” containing thousands of alternative plans.
Congressional plan (enacted 2018) State Senate plan (enacted 2011)
Figure 1. This paper studies the aggregation of votes from geographic units to districts,
which is intractable to study by complete enumeration of possibilities. We develop persistent
homology techniques to summarize the districting problem. This figure shows a precinct
map of Pennsylvania with key cities identified. The precincts are colored by voting results
from the 2016 Presidential election (blue for Democratic, red for Republican). Current
districts in Pennsylvania are shown with the same coloring. Note that the Congressional
districts are balanced to within one-person population deviation (by 2010 Census count).
1.3. Studying districting ensembles with persistent homology. Suppose we want to evaluate a dis-
tricting plan, either proposed or enacted, to label it as either a partisan gerrymander or not. Some authors
have proposed universal metrics for this purpose, which do not take the specific state, time period, or level of
redistricting into account: the same score, denominated in the same units, is supposed to flag gerrymanders
for Iowa’s Congressional seats in 2020 or for Mississippi state House in 1960. Examples which are widely
cited include the efficiency gap [SM15], and the mean-median score [MB15], which belongs to a family of
“partisan symmetry” metrics [GK07].
On the other hand, there has been growing consensus around the idea that evaluating a map requires
comparing it to a range of alternatives that hold the geography, demography, and redistricting rules constant.
In the last several decades, the use of “demonstration plans” has been rising in court cases: in addition to
the map under consideration, a court also views plans submitted by various advocacy groups and political
actors. While traditionally all of these benchmark plans are drawn “by hand,” the last ten years has seen
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the adoption of computer algorithms in court cases, where large generated ensembles of possible districting
plans are used as a backdrop of comparison for a proposed or enacted plan. The use of algorithmic ensemble
methods has already had a major impact on a number of recent court cases, notably Pennsylvania and North
Carolina, where ensemble methods were cited by courts in the successful invalidation of the state’s enacted
maps as partisan gerrymanders [Mat17, Peg17, Duc18b].
Algorithmic ensembles can easily boost the number of alternatives to consider into the hundreds of thou-
sands, far beyond the point where each map can be carefully analyzed with the human eye. For this reason,
summary statistics are computed for the maps in the ensemble, then compared to the plan under evaluation.
For example, one might choose one or several recent elections in order to fix a background pattern of voting,
then count the number of districts won by each party as the district lines vary. If the map under evaluation
gives the controlling party the majority in an outlying number of districts—in other words, if the plan secures
more seats for Party A than the vast majority of alternatives—this could reveal that the map was made
with impermissible partisan intent and/or has unreasonably skewed effects.
We can therefore say that modern research into redistricting forces us to be able to understand the essential
qualities of large collections of territorial partitions, preferably in a way which captures both geography and
relevant summary statistics, such as those connected to party or race. The method we propose in this
paper is illustrated with respect to partisan statistics, but can be applied more generally. We combine and
summarize the adjacency and vote share information from a districting plan into a dual graph (see §2.1),
decorated by vote shares under some given electoral pattern. We can now ask questions like: how many
connected components of support for Party A are there? A more sophisticated version of this question,
which considers multiple thresholds at once, is answered by persistent homology, the mathematical theory
underlying our method.
In this paper we apply methods from TDA to summarize ensembles of districting plans generated via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling. There has been some prior work using TDA to study similar
ensembles of generated data, such as simulated polymer conformations [ESR16] or simulated neuronal spike
trains [DMFC12, CDM18]. To our knowledge, this is the first geospatial application.
1.4. Broad goals and novel contributions. Before we proceed, we highlight an important guiding prin-
ciple in this paper: namely, we will measure the success of our topological data analysis techniques by their
ability to uncover information which cannot be easily observed from maps “with one’s eyes.” Consider Fig-
ure 1, for example, which shows the distribution of votes in the 2016 Presidential election in Pennsylvania
(following the contemporary U.S. color convention of red for Republican, blue for Democratic). No advanced
data analysis techniques are required to observe that Philadelphia and Pittsburgh are far bluer than the
rural north of the state. What is not clear, however, is where the blue districts will fall in a typical redis-
tricting plan. This is partly because the blue clusters in the map have widely different population sizes. A
small Democratic-leaning city like State College (≈50,000 people) will have little impact on a 700,000-person
Congressional district, but may dominate the voting in a smaller 63,000-person state House district if the
boundaries fall just so.
The main contributions of this paper are
• Scale and zoning. We propose TDA as a tool for studying nuanced scale effects in partition
problems. In particular, persistence diagrams let us read off a zoning of the state into redistricting-
relevant regions at each districting scale.
• Comparing elections. Fixing a scale, we can study the difference between two vote patterns in
natural units.
• Signals of gerrymandering. Finally, we consider the use of TDA to study differences in partisan-
biased ensembles of plans.
These techniques are applied to Pennsylvania and North Carolina, where in each case we have several ex-
amples of human-made plans for which we have a ground-truth label of gerrymandered or not gerrymandered.
We find that each of our proposals is able to detect phenomena in those states that can be corroborated by
secondary analysis. These findings pass the “can’t-be-seen-with-your-eyes” test, and we hope that they will
generate interest in the wider community of TDA practitioners.
1.5. Outline of the paper. In Section 2, we define districting plans in the language of graph theory and
briefly describe the methods that generate ensembles of plans. The persistent homology framework for
studying districting plans is laid out in detail; to keep the exposition self-contained, we describe the relevant
4 MOON DUCHIN, TOM NEEDHAM AND THOMAS WEIGHILL
tools from TDA with a narrow focus on the application at hand. Section 3 presents the three principal
applications described above. We use the persistent homology formalism to compare scales of redistricting, to
compare data from different elections on the same districting plan ensembles, and to determine distinguishing
features from ensembles of partisan-tilted districting plans. In Sections 4-5, we apply our methods to
ensembles of plans in Pennsylvania and North Carolina. Finally, the stability and robustness of the TDA
signatures is explored in Section 6. Drawing on a standard result from [CSEH07] on the stability of persistence
diagrams to perturbations in their input data, we derive a guaranteed upper bound on our districting plan
representations when perturbing electoral and geographical data. These theoretical results are accompanied
by data that raises our confidence in the robustness of our analysis.
2. Background and mathematical framework
In this section we describe the details of our topology-based approach to studying districting plans. We
begin by precisely defining the notion of a districting plan and briefly describing our method for generating
ensembles of plans. Next we apply the persistent homology pipeline to certain filtered graphs associated to
the plans. To keep the description accessible, we opt to restrict our exposition of persistent homology to our
specific application rather than appealing to any general theory. We use [EH10, Car14] as general references
for persistent homology.
2.1. Redistricting as a graph partition problem. A districting plan is a partition of a state into
geographical regions meeting certain criteria, which vary by state. The building blocks are geographic units
such as census blocks or election precincts. A very brief summary of key redistricting rules and principles is
needed to set up the problem. The number of Congressional districts in a state is deterministically related
to the Census population by a formula that has been in place for nearly sixty years; the new apportionments
will be announced in 2021. The number of districts in the state legislative houses is typically fixed in state
constitutions and is rarely changed. A criterion for a districting plan which is common to most states (and
essentially active in all) is that each district must be “contiguous,” i.e., the induced subgraphs on the pieces
of the partition should be connected. And it is a universal requirement that the districts be population-
balanced: each district must have equal population, up to a small tolerance for deviation. For our purposes
we will fix a deviation limit , so that each of the districts should be no less than (1− ) and at most (1 + )
times ideal size, which is total Census count divided by k.
After fixing the choice of units, we are able to define a districting plan more formally as a graph partition,
with notation following [Duc18a, AGR+19, DDS19]. Given a tiling of a state by geographic units that overlap
only along boundaries, let G = (V,E) be the unit dual graph—for instance, we can form a precinct dual graph
or a census block dual graph. This is defined by having each vertex in V correspond to a geographic unit of
the state, then connecting two vertices by an edge if and only if their units are geographically adjacent (i.e.,
share a boundary of positive length). We denote vertices in V by v or w and an edge in E with endpoints v
and w is denoted vw. For a subset V ′ ⊆ V , recall that the induced subgraph on V ′ is the graph G′ = (V ′, E′)
containing all the edges of E that have both endpoints in V ′. We adopt the slight abuse of notation to
refer by G′ to either the induced subgraph or its vertex set V ′, as needed. We will frequently make use of
functions p : V → R, such as a population count for every unit. We will write p(G′) to refer to the sum∑
v∈V ′ p(v).
Definition 1 (Districting plans as balanced connected partitions). Given a graph G = (V,E), a number of
districts k ≥ 2, a weighting function p : V → R, and a balance threshold , let Pk,(G) be the set of partitions
P = {P1, . . . , Pk} where Pi = (Vi, Ei) are induced graphs on a vertex partition V = V1 unionsq · · · unionsq Vk with each
Pi connected and satisfying the balance condition
(1− ) · p(G)
k
≤ p(Pi) ≤ (1 + ) · p(G)
k
.
Each P ∈ Pk,(G) is called a districting plan, and each Pi is called a district.
As alluded to above, districting plans are typically subjected to other tests of quality. One prominent
example is “compactness,” which requires that the shapes of districts look reasonable on a map. Other
criteria prefer plans that hew to county and municipal boundaries, that respect “communities of interest,”
and so on. And finally, but by no means insignificantly, the whole country is subject to the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (VRA), a rule that requires adequate access to representation for certain kinds of demographic
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minorities. Generating a districting plan meeting all relevant validity criteria is a complicated and delicate
process, and in this paper we will only operationalize population balance, contiguity, and compactness.1
Perhaps the most concise summary of the geographic layout of a redistricting plan is the data of which
districts are next to which. This information is naturally captured in a graph structure that is formed by
aggregation from the dual graph of the state’s geographic units: each vertex of the graph now corresponds
to a district, and edges connect nodes from adjacent districts (see Figures 3 and 16). This construction is
referred to as a district dual graph for the plan.
One might hope that even within a large ensemble of plans, the types of graphs one obtains are relatively
restricted, thereby uncovering a common feature of the plans in the ensemble. It turns out in practice that
there is a huge variety in the types of graphs in even a modest ensemble of 1000 plans. In a generated
ensemble of 18-district plans for Pennsylvania (details of ensemble generation are provided in Section 2), 991
distinct graph isomorphism classes are represented among the 1000 dual graphs. Examples of some of these
graphs are shown in Figure 2 and some basic graph statistics of the ensemble are shown in Figure S1. As
the number of districts in the plan increases, so does the variety of graphs: the dual graphs constructed from
our generated ensembles of 1000 50-district plans are typically all unique up to isomorphism. This suggests
that passing from districting plans to dual graphs is not enough of a reduction in representation complexity
to make direct analysis of the space of a plans a tractable option.
Figure 2. Abstract graph representations of three 18-district plans for Pennsylvania.
2.2. Markov chains and districting ensembles. In this paper we will generate plans via a Markov chain
algorithm called ReCom (short for Recombination), but our TDA methods can be used to study any ensemble
of districting plans regardless of how it was generated. We briefly describe the ReCom algorithm; more
details can be found in [DDS19] (see also [DDS18] for an early application of this algorithm to redistricting
in Virginia). The GerryChain package, which implements the ReCom algorithm, is publicly available at
github.com/mggg/GerryChain.
Let G = (V,E) denote a unit dual graph and suppose that P = {P1, . . . , Pk} is a valid districting plan
(meaning that it satisfies all of the geographic and demographic criteria required by the particular state).
ReCom is a Markov chain whose state space is Pk,(G). A step in the chain is taken as follows. First, two
distinct adjacent districts Pi and Pj are chosen uniformly at random. Next, a random spanning tree of the
connected subgraph Pi∪Pj ⊂ G is constructed. Deleting an edge from this spanning tree repartitions Pi∪Pj
into P ′i ∪P ′j , which together with the other districts defines a new partition of G. After a validity check, the
chain can move there as its next state. If no edge is found whose deletion produces a valid partition, then a
new spanning tree is constructed, and the process iterates.
Details of the ReCom algorithm, as well as theoretical and experimental evidence of its performance, are
provided in [DDS19]. The main takeaways are that ReCom runs quickly enough to generate large ensembles,
with convergence heuristics indicating approximate independence of starting point. The ReCom stationary
distribution is well-approximated by a distribution on Pk,(G) that weights a plan P in proportion to its
compactness, given by an appropriate isoperimetric score on the districts [CDRR20].
2.3. Filtrations on dual graphs. Let P = {P1, . . . , Pk} ∈ Pk,(G) be a districting plan for a state with
unit dual graph G. As described in Section 2.1, we form the district dual graph associated to P , denoted
GP = (VP , EP ), as the quotient graph of G associated to the partition P , with vertices wi corresponding to
districts Pi.
1For work that layers in more complicated districting criteria, see for instance [DD19].
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Since the vertices of the dual graph G represent geographic units, numerical data assigned to the units
(such as population, demographic counts, or vote counts) induce functions f : V → R. The main data of
interest for the applications in this paper will be the number of votes for a Republican candidate r : V → R
and the number of votes for a Democratic candidate d : V → R in a particular election. Given this data, we
can compute the Republican vote share by district R : Pk,(G)× {1, . . . , k} → R as follows:
RP (i) = R(P, i) =
r(Pi)
r(Pi) + d(Pi)
.
Note that this can be thought of as an average of a binary Republican voting function over the major-party
voters of the district.
Although the analysis in this paper will focus on the Republican vote share function R, we remark that
our method can be used to analyze any function of interest f : V → R. From such a function, one can always
induce a function F summing or averaging f over the units that make up each district. We regard such an
F as a filtration function on the vertices of GP . For the sake of simplicity, we sometimes make the (mild)
assumption that the values of any filtration function F are distinct over the districts of a plan, and we will
also assume that the range of F is in the interval [0, 1]. Then the output of any filtration function F on a
plan with k districts is k values, which can be organized in increasing order, 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < · · · < tk ≤ 1.
Definition 2 (Filtration). Let GP be a district dual graph for a plan with k districts and a fixed filtration
function F , and suppose that the vertices {w1, . . . , wk} are indexed in increasing order F (w1) < · · · < F (wk).
Let ti = F (wi). Then we define the filtered dual graph associated to (G,P, F ) to be the sequence of graphs
Gt1P ⊂ Gt2P ⊂ · · · ⊂ GtkP ,
where each G
tj
P is the induced graph on the vertices {w1, . . . , wj}.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. The definition of E
tj
P simply means that edges from GP are added to
the filtered dual graph as soon as possible (i.e., as soon as both of their endpoint vertices appear). In the
standard language of persistent homology, the filtered dual graph is a one-dimensional filtered simplicial
complex obtained via a sublevel set filtration [CSEH07].
2.4. Persistence diagrams. We would like to track the evolution of the shape of a filtered dual graph
as we run through the values tj . We focus on the evolution of the simplest topological features of the
graphs: their number of connected components. This evolution is encoded in a persistence diagram D =
{(b1, d1), . . . , (bk, dk)}, thought of as recording “birth” and “death” times of each connected component in
the filtration. For each i, set bi = ti and set di = ti′ , where i
′ ≥ i is the minimum index such that the
component of wi in G
ti
P contains a node whose index is less than i. (Since no such index exists for i = 1, we
put d1 =∞.)
The persistence diagram is a set of points (b, d) with b ∈ R, d ∈ R ∪ {∞} and 0 ≤ b ≤ d, so can be
drawn in a unit square above the diagonal, with ∞ represented at d = 1.1 (say), as in Figure 3. In general,
a persistence diagram could be a multiset, containing repeated points. In our application, we have assumed
that the ti values are distinct, so the points in D have multiplicity one.
Persistence diagrams are a ubiquitous summary statistic used in TDA. The precise, general definition
of a persistence diagram relies on a decomposition theorem from representation theory known as Gabriel’s
theorem, which was proved in [Gab72], with the connection to topological data analysis first observed in
[CDSM09]. When representing a persistence diagram one typically omits points along the diagonal, as these
represent “trivial” topological features.
Remark 1.
(1) The persistence diagram defined here describes the evolution of the zeroth-homology of the filtered
dual graph; this is the so-called degree-0 persistent homology of the filtered dual graph. Likewise,
persistent homology in higher degrees can be computed, tracking appearances and disappearances of
higher-dimensional topological features such as loops and voids. We hope to explore first homology
in future work.
(2) The definition above entails a convention sometimes referred to as the Elder Rule in the persistent
homology literature: when two components merge, the component with the more recent birth time is
annihilated. See [EH10] for a discussion of this convention, as well as the more recent theoretical
justification provided in [Cur18].
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∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
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1
≤ 8% Repub
≤ 37% Repub
≤ 55% Repub
≤ 66% Repub
≤ 100% Repub
Filtration by Repub share
Districting plan
Dual graph
Persistence diagram
Figure 3. The main method: turning a districting plan into a persistence diagram. The
persistence diagram captures both the adjacency information and the vote shares for the
districts in a plan.
The entire pipeline described so far is summarized in Figure 3. In the end, this pipeline reduces a
very complex object (a geographical partition of a state together with a function describing, e.g., election
data) to a simple, if somewhat abstract, summary statistic (a persistence diagram encoding the evolution of
connectivity of districts according to the function). It is the thesis of this paper that this large reduction in
complexity preserves, and in fact illuminates, interesting geographical and political properties of the plans.
Our study of persistence diagrams for redistricting ensembles will require some quantitative tools described
in the following subsections.
2.5. Wasserstein distances. Let D1 and D2 be a pair of persistence diagrams. We introduce a standard
family of distance metrics used to compare persistence diagrams.
Definition 3 (Wasserstein p-distance). Let p ∈ [1,∞] and let (b, d) be a point in a persistence diagram.
Define the diagonal p-distance ∆p(b, d) to be the `p distance from (b, d) to the nearest point on the diagonal
{(x, x) | x ≥ 0}. A partial bijection between D1 and D2 is a bijection φ from a subset of D1 onto a subset of
D2. We use the notation φ : D1 9 D2 for a partial bijection, dom(φ) for the domain of φ and im(φ) for its
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image. For p <∞, define the p-cost of a partial bijection φ by
(costp(φ))
p
=
∑
(b,d)∈dom(φ)
‖(b, d)− φ(b, d)‖pp +
∑
(b,d) 6∈dom(φ)
∆p(b, d)
p +
∑
(b′,d′) 6∈im(φ)
∆p(b
′, d′)p.
This extends to a p =∞ cost in the usual way, as a supremum:
cost∞(φ) = max
{
max
(b,d)∈dom(φ)
‖(b, d)− φ(b, d)‖∞, max
(b,d) 6∈dom(φ)
∆∞(b, d), max
(b′,d′) 6∈im(φ)
∆∞(b′, d′)
}
.
Finally, define the Wasserstein p-distance between D1 and D2 by
(1) dp(D1,D2) = inf
φ:D19D2
costp(φ).
The Wasserstein p-distances are naturally described in the language of matching features. The goal is
to match points in the diagram, which we now recall represent persistent topological features. A partial
bijection φ defines such a matching of features; those points not in the domain or range of φ are considered
to be matched with a “trivial feature” on the diagonal (i.e., a feature with zero lifespan). The p-cost costp(φ)
of matching φ measures how far points have to be moved in Lp distance, and the goal is to find a matching
which minimizes this cost. For a given pair of persistence diagrams, we will refer to the partial bijection
φ that achieves the infimum in (1) above as an optimal Lp matching. This will be referenced later when
comparing Fre´chet means for different ensembles or vote data.
Traditionally, the p = ∞ Wasserstein distance, also known as bottleneck distance, has been the standard
choice for comparing persistence diagrams in topological data analysis. It was one of the first metrics of this
type to be introduced [CSEH07] and its matching cost is the simplest to interpret: the cost of matching (b, d)
to (b′, d′) is whichever is larger, the difference in birth times or the difference in death times. It was moreover
shown in that paper that the bottleneck distance enjoys stability under perturbations of filtrations generating
persistence diagrams (this result will be stated and used in Section 6 below). The use of bottleneck distance
was later justified at a more theoretical level by the famous Isometry Theorem. This theorem, established in
[CCSG+09a] and [Les15], states that the bottleneck distance between persistence diagrams coincides with the
so-called interleaving distance, a distance which is defined purely in terms of morphisms between persistence
modules using the language of category theory. This category-theoretic interpretation of bottleneck distance
was extended to the other Wasserstein distances in the recent paper [BSS18]. On the computational side,
the optimal partial bijections required by the Wasserstein distances can be computed using the Hungarian
algorithm (see, e.g., [CCSG+09b]), a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the assignment problem required
to find an optimal matching.
2.6. Fre´chet means. Let (X, d) denote an arbitrary metric space. For a finite sample x1, . . . , xn from X,
define a discrete probability measure 1n
∑n
j=1 δxj , where δxj the Dirac measure at xj . The associated Fre´chet
functional F : X → R is defined by
F (x) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
d(x, xj)
2.
A Fre´chet mean of the sample is a minimizer of this Fre´chet functional, i.e., a barycenter for the collection
of points. Below, we will make heavy use of barycenters to summarize ensembles of diagrams.
Metric barycenters are guaranteed to exist uniquely in spaces of nonpositive curvature. We are not in
that setting, but are nonetheless able to leverage nice metric features to get a well-behaved barycenter con-
struction. With the p = 2 Wasserstein distance, Turner et al. show that the space of all persistence diagrams
is an Alexandrov space of nonnegative curvature: a complete, separable geodesic space with curvature ≥ 0
in the sense of comparison triangles [TMMH14]. Despite the positive curvature, these metric spaces have
helpful structure: they admit a notion of a tangent space at each point, which can be endowed with an inner
product (see [Lyt06] for general theory). Moreover, semiconcave functions have well-defined gradients. It
is shown in [TMMH14] that the Fre´chet functional is semiconcave, motivating its optimization via gradient
descent.
The [TMMH14] authors then propose the following algorithm. For persistence diagrams {D1, . . . ,Dm},
suppose that D(i) is the current Fre´chet mean candidate. An update is performed as follows:
(1) Compute optimal partial bijections φ
(i)
j : D(i) 9 Dj ;
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Figure 4. Pairing each plan in a districting ensemble with PRES16 vote data gives an
ensemble of persistence diagrams. These plots show overlays of the diagram ensembles
for k = 18, 50, 203 respectively. In the second row, we add the Fre´chet mean F for each
ensemble, shown in red, representing an “average” persistence diagram for the ensemble.
13 districts
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
50 districts
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
120 districts
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
Figure 5. Overlaid persistence diagrams with Fre´chet mean (in red) for each of the NC
ensembles (with PRES16 vote data).
(2) Extend φ
(i)
j to a function φ
(i)
j D(i) → Dj ∪{(x, y) ∈ R2 | x = y} by declaring φ(i)j (b, d) to be the point
on the diagonal nearest to (b, d) for each (b, d) 6∈ dom(φ(i)j );
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(3) For each (b, d) ∈ D(i), update to the arithmetic mean of the set of images φ(i)j (b, d);
(4) Let the new Fre´chet mean candidate D(i+1) be the updated point collection.
This process is shown to converge, at least to a local minimum of the Fre´chet functional. As this is an iterative
algorithm, the local minimum found depends on the seed D(1), that is, the initial Fre´chet mean candidate.
To mitigate this dependence in our analysis, we run the algorithm multiple times, using each persistence
diagram in our collection as a seed, and take the local minimum with the lowest Fre´chet functional value as
our final Fre´chet mean.
2.7. Computational details. The main code base used for this paper is available on GitHub 2. The
ensembles used in this paper were generated using the open-source package GerryChain developed by the
Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group [Ins18]. GerryChain implements numerous Markov chains on
Pk,(G) for generating ensembles of districting plans, including the recombination and flip chains discussed
in this paper. For the main ensembles used in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we sampled every 50th plan from
an ensemble of 50,000 plans generated using a ReCom chain with  = .02 as the maximum population
deviation. The Congressional and state Senate ensembles were generated from dual graphs constructed from
the precinct shapefiles available from MGGG [MGG20b]. For the state House ensembles, more granularity
is required in order to get satisfactory population balance, so we used census block dual graphs. In the
case of North Carolina, the state releases electoral data at the block level for redistricting purposes. For
Pennsylvania, election results were disaggregated from the precinct level down to blocks using the geospatial
data package called MAUP [MGG20a]. The persistence diagrams were generated using the library GUDHI
(https://gudhi.inria.fr) [MBGY14].
3. Methods
We propose three types of analysis enabled by persistent homology on ensembles of districting plans.
3.1. Scale and zoning. The winner-take-all plurality structure of the American districting system intro-
duces significant non-linearity to the relationship between votes and seats, whose patterns we seek to capture.
The key question here asks how the fine-grained vote data by precinct (see Figures 1 and 11) translates into
an outcome at the district level. We would like to isolate the effects of district size on the geography and
partisan properties of redistricting plans. A scale study was carried out in [RW20] by a direct comparison of
the district size to the range of observed partisan outcomes in an ensemble, using recent Pennsylvania voting
patterns. In this section, we use topological signatures to probe scale effects further. The main finding is
that at each scale, the state decomposes into zones of partisan support whose anchor points can be detected
by persistent homology techniques.
Before we discuss the application of our method to ensembles of maps, we first illustrate the information
captured on individual plans. Figure 1 shows the currently enacted Congressional and Senate districts for
Pennsylvania, colored by Trump vs. Clinton share (Pres 2016). Comparing to the choropleth at the top
of Figure 1, we can see that at the Congressional scale, the Democratic voting in Erie and State College
is outweighed by the surrounding Republican votes, while the Senate scale allows those cities to pull their
districts more strongly. Thinking in terms of peaks of Democratic vote share, Pittsburgh, Harrisburg, and
Philadelphia are all pronounced peaks on the precinct level, with the corresponding Congressional districts
(18, 10, and 3, respectively) also showing up as peaks on the district level.
Homological persistence will capture a relative height of these peaks in the following way: Each district
which is more Democratic than all its neighbors shows up as a point (b, d) in the persistence diagram, where
b is precisely its Republican vote share. A value of d on the ‘death’ axis means that any path from that
district to a more Democratic one must pass through a district whose Republican share is at least d. Thus
the persistence p = d− b is a kind of relative intensity of Democratic voting. For example, District 10 is only
9 percentage points more Democratic than neighboring District 11, which in turn is adjacent to District 6, a
more Democratic district than District 10. So the persistence of its feature is 9. Contrast this with District
18: any path from District 18 to a more Democratic district must pass through either District 13 or 15, each
of which is more than 36 points less Democratic than District 18. This gives Pittsburgh a persistence of 36.
It is clear that a Senate plan, with a larger number of smaller districts, will tend to have more peaks, such
2github.com/mggg/TDA-redistricting
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as Erie in the northwest corner; the greater number of features shows up in the Senate plan’s persistence
diagram, together with the solutions to the minimax problems that describe their relative height.
So far we have discussed the interpretation of persistence for specific plans, but of course different plans
may have different structure. The use of Fre´chet means will allow us to examine how much common structure
there is across the plans of a districting ensemble.
Step 1. Overlay. Start with a state, a number of districts k, and some fixed vote data such as from a
recent election. We generate an ensemble of one thousand plans (see Section 2.7) and form diagrams
D1, . . . ,D1000. As a first step, we can overlay the thousand diagrams (taking the unions of the sets
{(b, d)}) as the top row of Figure 4 does for Pennsylvania ensembles. To tease apart the structure
of these plots, we compute the Fre´chet mean F of the ensemble as in the next row of Figure 4. This
gives us one summarized view of the ensemble as an “average” persistence diagram.
Step 2. Marking. Next, we want to extract a marking of the individual persistence diagrams. Where k is
the number of districts, we can choose ` ≤ k points in F that are deemed sufficiently far from the
diagonal to be significant. Then for every diagram Di in our ensemble, we match the points in Di to
the chosen points in F using an optimal L2 matching (see Section 2.5), inducing a partial labeling
of the individual persistence diagrams by elements of the Fre´chet mean. Returning to the overlaid
diagram, we can now create individual Fre´chet point plots corresponding to each significant feature
of F , with the property that each diagram Di contributes at most one point to this plot.
Step 3. Localization. For a significant feature of F , many of the Di have a corresponding feature, picking
out a district that initiated the connected component in the filtration of the district dual graph.
We can then measure how often in the ensemble each geographical unit belonged to that district.
This gives us a heat map that shows us where the feature is located in the state. Figure 8 shows
Fre´chet point plots and corresponding precinct heat maps for PA Congressional and Senate districts.
(Supplemental Figure S2 uses a census block heat map for the House ensemble.)
Step 4. Zoning. If the filtration is in terms of one party’s share (here, Republican), we can then zone the
state into clusters of districts won by the other party (here, Democratic), as follows. There is a
one-to-one correspondence between persistence features in the northwest quadrant of the diagram D
(i.e., b < .5, d > .5) and clusters of Democratic-won districts. The birth time ensures that the cluster
is anchored by a Democratic-won district and the death time ensures that it is separated from other
clusters by Republican-won districts. For each localized point in F , we consider northwest-quadrant
points marked by it in the Di, representing Democartic clusters of districts. We can map these
clusters and report their average number of districts.
When studying scale effects, we are interested in which areas represent peaks at each scale (usually cities
from the Democratic point of view). Crucially, cities only show up as individuated peaks in Democratic vote
strength when they are separated from other cities by redder districts—a property that it would be hard to
see with one’s eyes.
Note that there is no a priori reason that the localization step should produce a geographically specific
position for each Fre´chet feature. Picking out an identifiable location at this step is a signal that there is
consistency across the ensemble in the correspondence of geography and aggregated voting. The method has
succeeded in zoning the state at a given scale if the heat maps are geographically coherent. If localization
succeeds, the workflow lets us refer to the Fre´chet features by geographical names and expected number
of Democratic-won districts for a given election: the Philadelphia zone (5.6 Congressional districts), the
Pittsburgh zone (1.2 Congressional disricts), and so on.
3.2. Comparing elections. In the previous section, we studied ensembles of plans relative to some fixed
vote pattern. Our second type of analysis will involve varying the vote data. We ask several questions.
Do the Fre´chet means themselves tell us something interesting about the relationship in voter preferences
between elections? How robust are the patterns learned above to a shift in the chosen electoral baseline?
For a given state and district size, we again use an ensemble of one thousand districting plans. We then
vary the vote data (but not the ensemble of plans) to produce multiple ensembles of diagrams, with an
associated Fre´chet mean plot for each vote pattern. Suppose that F and F ′ are Fre´chet means for the same
plans and two different elections. We can pair points from F to F ′ (by either a geographic pairing or an
optimal L2 matching) to provide a summary of electoral difference.
12 MOON DUCHIN, TOM NEEDHAM AND THOMAS WEIGHILL
For a pair of features that is matched, the direction of displacement carries information. Suppose the
mean point is (b, d) in F and (b′, d′) in F ′. If b > b′, this zone was anchored by a district that is more
Republican in the first election than the second. If d > d′, then the area surrounding the peak was more
Republican in the first election than the second. Putting these together can give a summary of the voting
performance of a city relative to its exurban ring at district scale.
If a feature in F is not matched (i.e., is matched to the diagonal) in F ′, this gives us a different kind of
information. This represents a substantial difference in the basic geography of representation under these
vote data, picking out a district cluster that represents a peak in one election but not the other.
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Figure 6. Overlaid Fre´chet means for various elections in PA.
3.3. Signals of gerrymandering. The examination of zoning and electoral shifts described above is not
targeted at identifying gerrymandering, but at understanding the tendencies of partisan-neutral districting.
Since the detection of gerrymandering is a difficult and high-profile problem, we now turn attention to
whether persistent homology can flag properties of plans that are designed to extract advantage for one
major party over the other.
Given a state, number of districts k, and vote pattern, our first step is to generate two ensembles: one
creating an unusually large number of Republican-majority districts and a second favoring Democrats. In
order to avoid flagging extremely competitive plans, we will identify a safe seat for Party A when the party’s
vote share exceeds .53. (Noting, of course, that for practical gerrymandering purposes, there may be a more
complicated calculus for trading off safety with win maximizaiton.)
To generate an ensemble of plans biased towards Party A, we use the ReCom algorithm with a Metropolis-
style weighting variant. When a new plan P is proposed by the algorithm, it is immediately accepted if the
number of safe seats does not decrease. A standard Metropolis weighting with respect to a score σ is to
choose a coefficient β and accept a plan scoring worse with probability e−β·∆σ. We will do that here: if the
safe seat count decreases by ∆s, then we accept P with probability e−2∆s.3 The purpose of the Metropolis
rule is to avoid getting stuck at local optima, while favoring better plans long-term. We use this algorithm
to generate two ensembles of one thousand plans each: a Democratic-favoring ensemble and a Republican-
favoring one. To illustrate the effectiveness of the weighted Markov chains, see Figure 7, showing a difference
in expectation of 3-4 seats out of 50.
From the two biased ensembles we then generate Fre´chet point plots and associated heat maps, then
compare the Fre´chet means with either a geographic or optimal L2 matching (see Section 2.5 for the definition
of an optimal L2 matching). As before, we have no guarantee that these two matching methods agree, but
in our case studies below we find that they do.
The aim of this analysis is to find and interpret geographical correlates of partisan advantage—not to
classify entire plans as gerrymandered or not. For that, we are unlikely to do better than simply comparing
the number of seats won under various electoral assumptions to a neutral ensemble.
3We note that for standard recombination moves, this can only occur with ∆s = 1, corresponding to a roughly 13.5%
probability of acceptance. The standard protocol is to adjust β until you have a run with a decent acceptance rate and an
ensemble that passes heuristic tests of convergence and quality.
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Figure 7. Comparison for the weighted ensembles of Senate plans, with Democratic-
favoring in blue and Republican-favoring in red. The simple weighting adjustment to the
Markov chain has successfully created a difference of 3-4 seats between the ensemble means.
Despite the significant change in the partisan outcome, we see only small movement in the
Fre´chet means.
In our case studies below, we can identify a few Fre´chet features which show a significant difference between
the two ensembles, and we can make inferences about the reasons for these differences. However, on the
whole there is surprisingly little difference between the persistence data for the two ensembles despite their
very different partisan seat shares. This further emphasizes that persistent homology is not primarily useful
for classifying plans, while reinforcing the narrative of robustly identifying relationships between geography
and aggregated vote data.
4. Case study: Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has 18 Congressional districts, 50 state Senate districts, and 203 state House districts. We
have cleaned electoral data from nine recent statewide elections: two Presidential elections (2012, 2016),
three U.S. Senate elections (2010, 2012, 2016), two Gubernatorial elections (2010, 2014), and two Attorney
General races (2012, 2016). The statewide party performance in these elections is shown here in Table 1.
PRES12 PRES16 SEN10 SEN12 SEN16 GOV10 GOV14 ATG12 ATG16
Repub % 47.29 50.35 51.05 45.44 50.72 54.52 45.22 42.58 48.57
Table 1. Overall Republican vote shares (with respect to two-party vote) for a range of
recent statewide elections in Pennsylvania.
4.1. Scale and zoning in PA. We begin with partisan-neutral ensembles of maps for each choice of
k = 18, 50, 203. We carry out the four steps of the scale analysis for each: overlay, marking, localization, and
zoning. We find four zones of relative Democratic strength at the Congressional level (Figure 8, top), corre-
sponding to Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Scranton, and Harrisburg, in that order. Philadelphia and Pittsburgh
are highly persistent while other two zones are weaker; only those two correspond to Democratic district
clusters, comprising 5.6 and 1.2 districts, respectively (Supplemental Figure S6).
In the state Senate ensemble (Figure 8, bottom), we find seven zones: Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Erie,
Harrisburg, State College, Lancaster, and Scranton, in sequence. It is quite valuable to note that the order
as well as the membership is different between Congressional and Senate zoning. Erie, Harrisburg, and
Scranton anchor zones that will be competitive overall, while the State College zone favors Republicans and
the Lancaster zone favors Democrats. The zoning analysis indicates 14.7 Senate districts in the Philadelphia
zone and 3.4 in Pittsburgh; even at this scale, the others each contribute less than one district on average.
For the state House ensemble (Supplemental Figure S2), the degree of geographic coherence (localization)
is weaker, but we can read off up to eleven zones in persistence order as follows: Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
Harrisburg, State College, Reading, Lancaster, Erie, Allentown, Scranton, York, Hermitage. And now all
but Hermitage should expect to anchor clusters of Democratic-won districts (not just Democratic relative
to their neighbors). We find 55.8 House districts in the Philadelphia zone—a massive bloc of the 203 seats.
14 MOON DUCHIN, TOM NEEDHAM AND THOMAS WEIGHILL
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
∞
0.25 0.5 0.75
0.25
0.5
0.75
Figure 8. Geographical localization of Fre´chet features in Pennsylvania Congressional and
Senate plans (k = 18, k = 50) with respect to PRES16 voting. The Senate features fairly
clearly capture the medium-sized cities of Pennsylvania.
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4.2. Comparing elections in PA. The Fre´chet means for the nine elections under consideration were
plotted for each scale of redistricting in Figure 6. For the Congressional ensemble, every election has two
highly persistent features in its Fre´chet mean F (corresponding to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh). Five out of
nine elections (GOV14, SEN12, PRES12, SEN10, and most prominently ATG12) have a third feature away
from the diagonal. By looking at the geographic data (not shown), we can tag all of these third features as
belonging to a Scranton zone. The presence of a Scranton feature means that Scranton is separated from
Philadelphia by a district redder than itself. Since the Scranton mean points always lie below d = .5, the
intervening districts between Scranton and Philaldelphia are still Democratic-favoring.
We isolate two elections of interest, PRES12 and PRES16, for a head-to-head comparison in Figure 9. We
draw lines to indicate the geographic pairing between the top eleven most persistent features (this pairing
differs from the optimal L2 matching between the Fre´chet means). Recall that the Republican statewide share
is .4729 in PRES12 versus .5035 in PRES16, a difference of about 3 percentage points. If the elections were
related by a uniform partisan swing (in which each geographic unit has its vote share additively perturbed by
the same amount), then each bi and each di would increase by the same amount, shifting the whole diagram
to the northeast with a (.03, .03) translation. This is not at all what we observe. We note that the Pittsburgh
feature actually shifts in a Democratic direction at all three scales, most notably at the smallest (House)
scale. The difference is in the middle of the state, which separates Pittsburgh from Philadelphia. There, the
Trump election has a significantly higher d value, indicating the reddening of the mid-state districts at all
three scales. The State College feature is especially interesting, and is marked in the state Senate and state
House plots. In the state Senate ensemble, the State College feature more or less adheres to the uniform
partisan swing direction: b and d are both lower for PRES16 than PRES12. However, for the state House
election, the trend reverses. This is because state House districts are small enough to separate the city of
State College (which was more Democratic in 2016 than 2012) from the surrounding area (which was less
Democratic in 2016 than 2012). Indeed, this effect can be seen in the geographic heat maps for this feature
in Figures 8 and S2—the State College feature is much more diffuse in the state Senate ensemble than in the
state House ensemble. In the Congressional ensemble, the Scranton feature is present in PRES12, but not
PRES16, telling us that the level of Trump preference in the Scranton district is not significantly distinct
from its surroundings (in contrast with Romney support).
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Figure 9. We isolate the Fre´chet means for two successive Presidential elections in PA.
The mean for PRES12 has a third off-diagonal feature at Scranton, while PRES16 does not.
A uniform partisan swing would show each red point displaced by (.03, .03) relative to its
paired green point, so the diagram summarizes the non-uniformity of the electoral shift.
4.3. Signals of gerrymandering in PA. We now turn to the party-biased ensembles. We focus on the
state Senate and the PRES16 vote for an illustrative discussion.
The matching between the two biased ensembles is shown with line segments in Figure 7, helping organize
the overlaid plots in Figure S3. All the off-diagonal points were successfully paired, and the geographic pairing
and optimal L2 matchings were identical, indicating that the persistence structure of the two ensembles was
very similar despite the significant difference in the overall number of Republican districts.
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It is instructive to compare the Pittsburgh and the Harrisburg features in the two ensembles, which
show opposite effects. The Harrisburg district is quite competitive, and the Republican ensemble shows the
effect you would expect: the district is several percentage points more Republican than in the Democratic
ensemble—enough to secure a Republican win in most cases. On the other hand, an overall Republican
advantage is correlated with a more Democratic Pittsburgh district; this is the well-known phenomenon called
“packing,” where wastefully high vote totals in some districts lead to overall disadvantage. In interesting
contrast to Harrisburg, the Erie cluster was very rarely anchored by a “safe” district for either party, despite
the weighting of the algorithm towards safe seats. Finally, the Republican-favoring ensemble clearly “cracks”
Democratic support near Scranton (6th feature), while the Democratic-favoring plot resembles the neutral
ensemble, indicating that in 1000 largely independent attempts, careful line-drawing near Scranton was not
a frequent property of maps selected for local improvements in Democratic seats overall.
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Figure 10. Comparison of point plots for the successive Fre´chet features in the PA Senate
ensembles that are biased for Democratic and Republican safe seats, respectively. Note the
contrast between the rigidity of the Erie feature (similar placement for both ensembles) and
the manipulability of the Harrisburg feature, though both anchor competitive districts.
5. Case study: North Carolina
We turn to North Carolina, which has 13 Congressional districts, 50 state Senate districts, and 120 state
House districts. We have cleaned data for seven statewide elections in North Carolina: Presidential elections
from 2012 and 2016, the US Senate elections from 2010, 2014 and 2016, and the Gubernatorial elections
from 2012 and 2016. The statewide two-way vote shares for these elections can be found in Table 2.
PRES12 PRES16 SEN10 SEN14 SEN16 GOV12 GOV16
Repub % 51.08 51.98 56.02 49.17 53.02 55.87 49.95
Table 2. Overall Republican vote shares (with respect to two-party vote) for a range of
recent statewide elections in North Carolina.
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Figure 11. Maps of North Carolina. Top: results from the 2016 Presidential election
(blue for Democratic, red for Republican). Bottom: North Carolina has a significant rural
Black population, unlike Pennsylvania. Greenville and Wilson are the largest towns in the
Northeast, but they are not the hubs of Black population.
5.1. Scale and zoning in NC. The Fre´chet point plots and accompanying heat maps using vote data from
the 2016 Presidential election are shown in Figure 12 and Supplemental Figure S4. Geographic localization
shows clear success in all three cases.
At the Congressional level, North Carolina admits three clear zones for this vote data: Durham, Charlotte,
and Asheville—interestingly, Congressional districts are large enough that the Asheville district contains
everything in the western tip of the state. A fourth zone anchored in Winston-Salem is sometimes present,
and there are indications of a possible fifth zone stretching south from Fayetteville. These geographically
more diffuse zones are often quite a bit more persistent than the corresponding zones in Pennsylvania.
In the state Senate ensemble, as with the Congressional ensemble, two highly persistent features appear
near Durham and Charlotte. In contrast with the Congressional ensemble, the Asheville zone is now more
geographically localized and is anchored by a Democratic-won district (b < .5) in all maps. It is notable
that the fourth feature is localized near the fourth from the Congressional ensemble, but a close inspection
shows that it has shifted from Winston-Salem to the nearby city of Greensboro, which is bluer but smaller.
For the first time, a rural area appears as a feature: the heavily African-American northeast of the state
anchors the sixth Fre´chet feature, and not the medium-sized cities of Rocky Mount, Greenville, and Wilson
that are nearby.
Raleigh is represented as a seventh Senate zone: a feature with b < .5 by a substantial amount, but low
persistence. This represents a cluster anchored by very Democratic Senate districts, but that quickly merges
with the Durham cluster. Its low persistence is an indicator that it is is not a completely independent zone
from Durham.
Moving from the Senate to the House scale, we get new (low-persistence) zones in the 9th and 10th
positions corresponding to Wilmington and Boone. This stands in contrast to the PA case, where the House
added four medium-persistence features compared to the Senate. In particular, none of the small towns in
the Northeast of North Carolina such as Greenville or Wilson are picked out in these plots. Rather, they
are embedded in the large Northeast zone. This is not solely attributable to size: each of Greenville, NC
and Reading, PA has the population of 1–1.5 House districts in its respective state. Rather, it reflects a
difference in the degree of urban concentration in the Democratic vote.
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Figure 12. Geographical localization of Fre´chet features in North Carolina Congressional
and Senate plans (k = 13, k = 50) with respect to PRES16 voting.
Since TDA is comparing vote totals aggregated to districts, it is not automatic that it would detect this
rural Democratic strength in North Carolina, but its signature is unmistakable at the Senate and House
scale, and already visible in Congressional ensembles.
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5.2. Comparing elections in NC. This time, we will compare a larger set of elections: all seven statewide
elections in our dataset, ranging from 2010 to 2016. Since the association of regions with Fre´chet mean points
was successful in the last section, we can again use the plots to summarize whether peaks of Democratic
support swing in sync with their periphery between elections.
For the most persistent feature (the Durham zone, at d = ∞), the spacing shows you the difference
in Democratic support between elections. If voting preferences swung linearly and uniformly around the
state, the displacement of the colored dots would be diagonal, with both coordinates displacing by the same
amount as the first feature. So we learn something nontrivial from this summary diagram: vote patterns
in Charlotte and surroundings swing much more linearly than in Asheville. In particular, Donald Trump
overperformed both in heavily Democratic Asheville and (even more) in its Republican periphery, relative to
a uniform swing prediction. More generally, Asheville’s partisan preference is unpredictably related to the
rest of Western North Carolina.
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Figure 13. Overlaid Fre´chet means for various elections in NC. In all three levels of redis-
tricting, the geography-to-voting signature is strong enough to label the second and third
features, shown circled, as Charlotte (left) and Asheville (right).
5.3. Signals of gerrymandering in NC. We begin by evaluating the two enacted Congressional maps for
North Carolina (2012 , 2016) against the PRES16 vote pattern (Figure 14). Since both plans were identified
by courts as Republican gerrymanders, we treat that as a reliable label. We overlay the persistence diagrams
for the two enacted plans with the Fre´chet means for the partisan-neutral ensemble of Congressional plans.
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Figure 14. Comparing two enacted Congressional plans for North Carolina with the en-
semble mean, against the PRES16 vote pattern in all three cases.
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The features for the enacted plans have significantly lower b values than the ensemble, indicating especially
Democratic districts anchoring two distinct clusters. The enacted plans each have only these two features,
while the mean—and over 80% of the maps in the neutral ensemble—includes a third feature corresponding
to Asheville. This is because both enacted plans slice a large part of Asheville into a district that avoids
the moderate partisan areas nearby; this district touches the Charlotte district and so becomes part of the
Charlotte zone. Note the suggestively carved boundaries in Figure 14A,C. This finding squares with public
perception: Asheville has been at the center of gerrymandering protests and activism for some time.
As in Pennsylvania, we close by examining the party-biased ensembles with respect to state Senate districts
and PRES16 voting. Figure 7D shows the matching between the Fre´chet means used to organize the Fre´chet
point plots in Figure S5 (again the geographic and optimal L2 matchings agreed).
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Figure 15. Comparison of point plots for the successive Fre´chet features in the NC Senate
ensembles that are biased for Democratic and Republican safe seats, respectively.
6. Stability
We now address the question of stability of our persistent homology signatures of vote and districting
data. In order to do so, we appeal to a stability result of [CSEH07] which is well known in the field. In
order to keep our exposition self-contained, we state the result in a special case which is relevant to our
application.
Theorem 1 ([CSEH07]). Let G = (V,E) be a graph with f and g real-valued functions on V and corre-
sponding persistence diagrams Df and Dg. Then
d∞(Df ,Dg) ≤ ‖f − g‖∞ ,
where ‖ · ‖∞ is the `∞ norm on functions V → R.
We then immediately obtain a stability result in our application, for the district dual graphs and Repub-
lican share filtration used above.
Corollary 1 (Stability under perturbations in vote data). The bottleneck distance between persistence di-
agrams associated to two elections and the same districting plan is bounded above by the largest change in
Republican vote share an any district.
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Figure 16. A small change to districts can cause a large change in persistence. In this
example (closely modeled on the enacted NC Congressional plan from 2012) we have changed
the assignment of only one geographic unit (a precinct of 3,300 people), and it removes a
highly persistent off-diagonal feature.
6.1. Theoretical stability under geographic perturbations. For a fixed plan, we have a strong and
easily interpretable stability result for bottleneck distance as elections shift. One could similarly ask if the
persistence diagram summaries are robust under small changes in the plan itself. A truly general result in
this direction is not possible, as is illustrated by the example in Figure 16.
In light of this fragility, some care must be taken to formulate a correct result on stability of bottleneck
distance under changes in districting plan. We formulate such a result in this subsection, and relate it to
experimental analysis in the following section using random perturbations.
Fix a state’s unit dual graph G = (V,E) and a districting plan P = {P1, . . . , Pk} ∈ Pk,(G). Let p be the
population function and T = p(V )/k be the ideal district size.
Definition 4. For districting plans P, P ′ ∈ Pk,(G), P ′ is called a (one-way) perturbation of P if, after
reindexing the districts as necessary, the plans agree in all but two districts Pi ∪ Pj = P ′i ∪ P ′j, and they
differ only by the move of vertices Vij = {v1, . . . , v`}, so that V ′j = Vj ∪ Vij and V ′i = Vi \ Vij. A general
perturbation has vertices Vij moved in one direction and Vji in the other direction between the two altered
districts.
A perturbation P, P ′ is called graph preserving if the labeled correspondence of districts induces an iso-
morphism of the district dual graphs.
For instance, the two North Carolina plans in Figure 16 are perturbations of each other by a single unit,
which means that |Vij | = 1. However, it is not a graph-preserving perturbation; the dual graphs GP and
GP ′ are not even abstractly isomorphic.
A ReCom step (as is used to generate our districting plan ensembles) can potentially produce a one-way
perturbation of a plan, but this is extremely unlikely because population is swapped in both directions with
very high probability. Moreover, ReCom steps are not always be graph-preserving because in re-splitting the
combined population of two districts in an arbitrary connected fashion, they can alter district adjacency with
the surrounding nodes.4 A simpler Markov chain method for generating ensembles of plans by single-unit
flips is studied here.
A flip move on a plan P is performed by reassigning a single vertex from one district to another in a manner
that preserves connectedness for all districts. It therefore necessarily induces a one-way perturbation, and
frequently a graph-preserving perturbation. A Markov chain can be defined by randomly selecting a vertex
to reassign at each step. Taking sequences of flip steps (obtained by rejection sampling flip step proposals)
defines a simple and commonly used Markov chain on the space of districting plans [HKL+18, CFP17].
4Several trials show that a ReCom step preserves the district dual graph with probability roughly .65. See Supplement for
more discussion.
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Recall that for a function f : V → R and a subset W ⊆ V we write f(W ) for the sum ∑v∈W f(v), and
that p is a weight function thought of as population on the nodes. We use the following notation below. Let
a, b : V → R be functions satisfying 0 ≤ a(v) ≤ b(v) ≤ p(v) for all v ∈ V , and for simplicity assume b > 0.
Let f be given by f = a/b, and we will abuse notation by using the same notation for a function on V or
on the district nodes VP . This induces district-level persistence diagrams DP and DP ′ . Fix α = αP,P ′ > 0
to be a lower bound on b(W )/p(W ) for W = Vi, V
′
i , Vj , V
′
j .
We will apply this to a = r, the Republican vote totals per node, letting b = r+d be the total major-party
votes per node, so that f = R, the Republican voting share, and α is a lower bound on the voting turnout
in districts affected by the perturbation. The more general notation is introduced here because there are
several other functions a, b that could induce interesting filtration functions on the dual graphs, for instance
to take third-party voting or other demographics into account.
We now state the stability result. Its proof is a straightforward application of Theorem 1, but we are
able to formulate the estimate in terms of quantities which are directly interpretable from a districting
perspective.
Theorem 2 (Stability under geographic perturbations). For a graph preserving one-way perturbation P, P ′
where vertices Vij are flipped from Pi to Pj,
d∞ (DP ,DP ′) ≤ 2
α(1− ) max (|f(Vij)− f(Pi)| , |f(Vij)− f(Pj)|) .
This gives us a bound on bottleneck distance for a perturbation in terms of how much the party vote share
in the flipped units compares to the districts that they flip between. The proportionality constant depends
on the population tolerance  and the voter turnout constant α, and is small under the realistic assumption
that   α. (For instance, with population deviation tolerance of 2% and an election with district-level
turnouts of at least 25%, we obtain a coefficient of roughly .163.)
Proof. Relabel if necessary so that the affected districts of P are P1, P2, and P
′ replaces those by P ′1, P
′
2,
with districts 3, . . . , k unchanged. Since the district dual graphs agree by assumption, the filtration function
by f is defined on that graph. Theorem 1 says that
d∞ (DP ,DP ′) ≤ ‖fP − fP ′‖∞ = max (|f(P1)− f(P ′1)|, |f(P2)− f(P ′2)|) .
Recall that f(P1) = a(P1)/b(P1), which in our case is Republican vote share, and likewise for the other
districts. To simplify the exposition, we write ai = a(Pi) for i = 1, 2 and similarly define a
′
i, bi, b
′
i; we also
write a¯ = a(V12) and similarly for b¯. Note that a
′
1 = a1 − a¯ and b1 = b′ − b¯. It follows that
f(P1)− f(P ′1) =
a1
b1
− a
′
1
b′1
=
a1
b1
− a1 − a¯
b1 − b¯
=
b1 ·a¯− a1 ·b¯
b1(b1 − b¯)
=
b¯
b′1
·(f(V12)− f(P1)) .
This works exactly similarly for P2.
Since P and P ′ are districting plans, the population balance condition implies that p(P1) and p(P ′1) both
lie in the interval [(1 − )T, (1 + )T ]. Since the vertices of V12 were moved without violating the balance
condition, we have p(V12) ≤ 2T .
Since b(W ) ≤ p(W ) for any vertex set W , we have
α(1− )b¯ ≤ 2α(1− )T ≤ 2α·p(V1) ≤ 2·b(V ′1) = 2b′1.
To complete the proof, we rearrange to obtain
b¯
b′1
≤ 2
α(1− ) . 
6.2. Experimental stability under geographic perturbations. While Theorem 2 gives a theoretical
stability guarantee for geographic perturbations, its applicability is somewhat limited in scope, since the
graph-preserving property is not automatic. In this section we present experimental evidence of stability.
We begin with Congressional and Senate ensembles for Pennsylvania. ReCom steps make large changes
to a map, and the ensembles here were sub-sampled so that each successive plan collected in a ReCom
ensemble is essentially independent of the last. So to illustrate stability we first turn to the much smaller
perturbations made by flipping the assignment of a single unit at a time. Flip steps make small changes to
the appearance of a plan—though most every pairwise district boundary has been changed after 1000 flip
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steps, the configuration of districts is clearly recognizable. In the examples shown in Figure 17, 1000 flip
steps moves the persistence diagram by d∞ = .009 and d∞ = .006 for Congress and Senate, respectively.
To contextualize distance magnitudes, note that pairs of maps in our ReCom ensembles (approximately
independent maps) often have pairwise bottleneck distances between .05 and .1 (see Figure 18).
Enacted/perturbed Congressional plan Enacted/perturbed state Senate plan
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Figure 17. Maps of enacted plans before and after perturbation by 1000 flip steps; dis-
trict adjacencies changed in both cases (e.g., blue/lavender for Congress, and purple/purple
for state Senate districts in the Southeast). Nonetheless we see only a small change in
persistence, which is typical for repetitions of this experiment.
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Figure 18. Distribution of bottleneck distances between pairs of plans in the Pennsylvania
ReCom ensembles. These distances can help us contextualize the size of the displacement
by Flip steps.
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We repeat the 1000-flip experiment on a larger set of initial maps to conclude the investigation of stability.
We take one hundred Congressional and one hundred state Senate maps from the ReCom ensembles and
make a sequence of 1000 flip steps starting from each of them. After each flip step, we compute the bottleneck
distance between the initial plan and the current one. The results are shown in Figure 19. Looking at these
bottleneck distance trace plots, we see that for the majority of maps, randomly flipping 1000 geographic units
had a modest effect on the persistence diagram, typically in the order of 0.01 in bottleneck distance. This
raises our confidence that the methods outlined here are reasonably robust to small geographic perturbation.
Perturbing PA Congressional districts (k = 18)
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Perturbing PA Senate districts (k = 50)
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Figure 19. Effect of iterating small geographic perturbations (single-unit flip steps) on
persistence. The red line indicates the average bottleneck distance over the
(
100
2
)
plans in
a ReCom ensemble E = {P (1), . . . , P (100)}, shown as a baseline for the distance between
approximately independent plans. For each i = 1, . . . , 100, we run 1000 flip steps from P (i)
and track the bottleneck distance to P (i). For k = 18, the persistence diagrams are seen to
be stable. The same is true for most 50-district plans, but not all.
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7. Conclusion
We have examined three approaches to the use of persistent homology in analyzing the complicated
geography of voting at different scales of aggregation: zoning, election comparison, and signatures of ger-
rymandering. In all three cases, our methods use persistence diagrams to summarize a large ensemble of
alternative districting plans. While the space of all valid redistricting plans for a state is intractably vast by
almost any definition, tools like these allow us to cut through that complexity to uncover key information
about the relationship of district lines to representation.
Vote-filtered dual graphs have been shown to lend themselves to interpretable (and nontrivial) observations
about redistricting, opening up several directions for future research.
Classifying salient geoclusters. A long-standing debate in the political science literature centers on the
question of whether racial gerrymandering protections like the Voting Rights Act actually produce counter-
intuitive partisan effects by disallowing the splitting of communities of color. The ideas introduced here can
reframe the question in a far more sophisticated and general way, locating areas in a state that are split
differently in party-biased ensembles or whose splitting correlates with party advantage.
Metrics on the space of plans. Converting districting plans to persistence diagrams allows us to compute
a bottleneck distance between districting plans given some fixed vote data. It will be interesting to compare
the bottleneck distance to other notions of distance between districting plans, such as the optimal transport-
based distance studied in [AGR+19] and the information-theoretic distance in [GNW20].
Embeddings. There are several methods in the literature for vectorizing persistence diagrams, such as
persistence landscapes [Bub15] and persistence images [AEK+17]—that is, each such method provides an
embedding of a set of persistence diagrams into a Hilbert space as a set of vectors. We can use these
methods to embed (ensembles of) plans in Euclidean space either for visualization or for clustering.
Distributions. Finally, the use of summary diagrams enables an approach to the comparison of different
sampling techniques, such as by the use of different Markov chains. We can fit distributions to ensembles of
persistence diagrams—either by first vectorizing them and fitting classical distributions, or by applying more
recent techniques directly to persistence diagrams themselves [MNO20]—allowing a summarized comparison
of sampling distributions.
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Appendix A. Supplemental figures
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Figure S1. Histograms of statistics of the dual graphs for the ensemble of 1000 18-district
plans for Pennsylvania. (Density is the ratio of the number of edges to the number of
possible edges,
(
18
2
)
= 153.)
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Figure S2. Geographical localization of eleven Fre´chet features in Pennsylvania House
plans (k = 203) with respect to PRES16 voting. These now pinpoint small cities, all the
way down to Hermitage (population 16,220).
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Figure S3. Expanding on Figure 10. Point plots and heat maps for the successive Fre´chet
features in the PA Senate ensembles that are biased for Democratic and Republican safe
seats, respectively. Note the contrast between the rigidity of the Erie feature (similar place-
ment for both ensembles) and the manipulability of the Harrisburg feature, though both
anchor competitive districts.
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Figure S4. Geographical localization of eleven Fre´chet features in North Carolina Senate
plans (k = 50) with respect to PRES16 voting.
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Figure S5. Comparison of point plots and heat maps for the successive Fre´chet features
in the NC Senate ensembles that are biased for Democratic and Republican safe seats,
respectively.
THE (HOMOLOGICAL) PERSISTENCE OF GERRYMANDERING 33
Figure S6. Location and average number of districts in connected components of
Democratic-won districts for Pennsylvania Congressional plans (k = 18) with respect to
PRES16 voting.
Figure S7. Location and average number of districts in connected components of
Democratic-won districts for Pennsylvania state Senate plans (k = 50) with respect to
PRES16 voting.
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Figure S8. Location and average number of districts in connected components of
Democratic-won districts for Pennsylvania state House plans (k = 203) with respect to
PRES16 voting.
Figure S9. Location and average number of districts in connected components of
Democratic-won districts for North Carolina Congressional plans (k = 13) with respect
to PRES16 voting.
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Figure S10. Location and average number of districts in connected components of
Democratic-won districts for North Carolina state Senate plans (k = 50) with respect to
PRES16 voting.
Figure S11. Location and average number of districts in connected components of
Democratic-won districts for North Carolina state House plans (k = 120) with respect
to PRES16 voting.
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ReCom steps on PA Congressional districts (k = 18).
ReCom steps on PA state Senate districts (k = 50).
Figure S12. Effect of iterating ReCom steps (merging and resplitting pairs of adjacent
districts) on bottleneck distance. We choose 100 starting plans P (i) from our Pennsylvania
ensembles. For each of i = 1, . . . , 100, we run 1000 ReCom steps (with no subsampling)
from P (i) and track the bottleneck distance to P (i) on the y-axis.
